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Optimal board monitoring in family-owned companies:  
Evidence from Asia 
 
ABSTRACT 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Issue: We propose that high levels of monitoring are not always in the best 
interests of minority shareholders. In family-owned companies the optimal level of 
board monitoring required by minority shareholders is expected to be lower than that 
of other companies. This is because the relative benefits and costs of monitoring are 
different in family-owned companies.  
Research Findings: At moderate levels of board monitoring, we find concave 
relationships between board monitoring variables and firm performance for 
family-owned companies but not for other companies. The optimal level of board 
monitoring for our sample of Asian family-owned companies equates to board 
independence of 38%, separation of the Chairman and CEO positions and 
establishment of audit and remuneration committees. Additional testing shows that the 
optimal level of board monitoring is sensitive to the magnitude of the agency conflict 
between the family group and minority shareholders and the presence of substitute 
monitoring.  
Practitioner/Policy Implications: For policymakers, the results show that more 
monitoring is not always in the best interests of minority shareholders. Therefore, it 
may be inappropriate for regulators to advise all companies to follow the same set of 
corporate governance guidelines. However, our results also indicate that the board 
governance practices of family-owned companies are still well below the identified 
optimal levels. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board Independence, Board of Directors, Family 
Firms, Monitoring. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The principal-agency conflict in public companies requires outside investors to 
monitor the activities of corporate insiders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The optimal 
level of monitoring is reached when the marginal benefit of additional monitoring 
equals the marginal cost for outside investors. However, as the level of monitoring 
can be influenced by the interests of corporate insiders (e.g. controlling shareholders 
or managers) it does not necessarily equate to the optimal level for outside investors 
(e.g. minority shareholders). For example, controlling shareholders can intentionally 
maintain a lower level of monitoring to maximize their own consumption of private 
benefits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). To combat this, corporate governance policies 
generally prescribe a higher level of monitoring to ensure the protection of minority 
shareholders. But, increased monitoring is only beneficial up to the optimal level for 
minority shareholders. Beyond this level, additional monitoring is wealth-decreasing. 
 In this study we propose that the optimal level of monitoring in family-owned 
companies is at a lower level than that of other companies. This is because the relative 
benefits and costs of monitoring to minority shareholders are different in 
family-owned companies. We focus on the monitoring conducted by the board of 
directors as this is the major mechanism that minority shareholders possess to monitor 
the activities of corporate insiders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). We propose that the 
benefits of board monitoring are lower in family-owned companies for two reasons. 
First, higher information asymmetry between the family group and outside parties in 
family-owned companies means that monitoring by outsiders (e.g. independent 
directors) is less effective in family-owned companies than other companies. Second, 
the family group’s substantial involvement in the selection and appointment of outside 
directors means that outside directors in family-owned companies are less likely to be 
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truly independent monitors. The result is that the same level of board monitoring 
results in a lower reduction in agency costs in family-owned companies relative to 
other companies.  
The costs of board monitoring are expected to be higher in family-owned 
companies for three reasons. First, recent studies show that family-owned companies 
are more effective at creating wealth than other companies and that increased 
monitoring activities hinder an effective management team’s ability to create wealth. 
Second, since wealth creation through undisclosable channels, such as political 
connections, is higher in family-owned companies, too much monitoring restricts the 
family group from creating wealth through these channels. Third, in family-owned 
companies additional monitoring can be unnecessary and costly as too much 
monitoring will replicate the monitoring already being performed by the family group. 
Therefore, for the same increase in monitoring, we expect the loss of wealth creation 
(or costs of unnecessary monitoring) to be greater in family-owned companies than 
other companies. 
In combination, the lower benefits and higher costs of board monitoring mean 
that the optimal level of board monitoring in family-owned companies is expected to 
be at a much lower level than other companies. Therefore at moderate levels of board 
monitoring, we expect to find a non-linear or concave relationship (with identifiable 
maximum or optimal point) between board monitoring and firm performance for 
family-owned companies but not for other companies. 
 This study builds on the work of Anderson and Reeb (2004) who show that the 
performance of family-owned companies is highest in the US when there is a balance 
between independent directors and family representatives on the board of directors. 
However, their study is not motivated by the relative benefits and costs of monitoring 
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to minority shareholders. We propose that performance is highest when family-owned 
companies adopt a level of board monitoring that satisfies minority shareholders. This 
optimal level balances the agency conflict between the family group and minority 
shareholders, while ensuring that the family group is not hindered in creating wealth 
for all shareholders. 
We also make a number of advances to the relevant literature. In our study, the 
strength of monitoring by the board of directors is measured through two variables - 
board independence and the existence of monitoring-related committees (audit, 
nomination and remuneration). We propose that this second measure (committee 
monitoring) is a cleaner proxy for the strength of board monitoring activities. The two 
main functions of the board of directors are to provide monitoring and advice. While 
the composition of the board may be a reflection of both of these functions, the 
existence of monitoring-related committees are more likely to reflect the monitoring 
activities of the board. 
We acknowledge the recent work by Boone et al. (2008), Coles et al. (2008) and 
Linck et al. (2008) who show that a company’s board structure depends on 
firm-specific characteristics. This study, therefore, examines whether the optimal 
level of board monitoring in family-owned companies is sensitive to the magnitude of 
the agency conflict between the family group and minority shareholders and the 
presence of substitute monitoring. The optimal level of board monitoring is expected 
to be lower when the interests of the family group and other shareholders are better 
aligned through higher cashflow rights ownership and when part of the monitoring 
load is borne by other parties (family group, equity blockholders and debtholders). 
The optimal level of board monitoring is expected to be higher when the family group 
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is entrenched through a ratio of control rights to cashflow rights ownership of greater 
than one.  
 In addition, to ensure our results are not driven by omitted variable bias, we use 
models with fixed firm and period effects. However, this necessitates a sample of 
companies that have experienced changes in monitoring practices over time. So, while 
we develop a general framework suited to all family-owned companies, we test our 
hypotheses using a specific sample of Asian companies in the period after the Asian 
crisis, when voluntary corporate governance codes were implemented.1 This allows us 
to have sufficient changes over time and since the changes were voluntary there is still 
variation in practices across companies. The focus on Asia also allows us to compare 
the relative benefits and costs of monitoring in Asian family-owned companies to the 
prior results of Anderson and Reeb (2004) in the US.  
 Our results indicate that at moderate levels of board monitoring, an optimal level 
of board monitoring exists in family-owned companies but not in other companies. 
Further analysis reveals that the optimal level of board monitoring is lower when the 
interests of the family group and minority shareholders are better aligned and when 
the family group is more involved in running the company (is undertaking more 
monitoring itself). The optimal level of board monitoring is higher when the family 
group is entrenched and when there is less substitute monitoring by debtholders. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
literature and develops hypotheses. The third section describes the data and 
methodology. The fourth section discusses the empirical results. The final section 
concludes the paper.  
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HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Agency costs arise from the separation of ownership and control in companies (Berle 
and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, the type and severity of 
agency costs differ across companies with different ownership structures. In 
widely-held companies, the major conflict of interest is between managers and 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In companies with concentrated 
ownership, the major conflict is between the controlling owner and minority 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Despite these differences in the forms of 
agency costs, corporate governance regulations (e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley Act) generally 
recommend the same corporate governance practices for all types of companies.2  
This study proposes that the fundamental determinant of agency costs is the 
ownership structure of the company and that corporate governance regulations should 
reflect these differences across ownership structures. In particular, we propose that 
family-owned companies have an optimal level of monitoring that is different to other 
companies. Family-owned companies are specifically distinguished from other 
companies for two reasons. First, family ownership is the dominant form of 
ownership around the world (Claessens at al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002). Second, 
family-owned companies have a specific model of ownership and control that is 
different to that of other ownership types (Lane et al., 2006). 
There are a number of different definitions of family firms in the literature. A 
broad definition of family firms used in the US is where the founder or a member of 
his or her family by either blood or marriage is an officer, director or blockholder in 
the company (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). This definition 
recognizes that the family is still somehow involved in the company. In Asia, family 
firms are generally defined as companies that are part of a family business group or 
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companies where the founding family is the largest shareholder (Claessens et al., 
2000). In this study we use this latter definition as we are interested in family firms 
where the founding family, as a group, is still the largest shareholder and is therefore 
in control of the company. 
Lane et al. (2006) details the characteristics of family-owned companies. The 
typical family-owned company follows the control model of corporate governance, 
where ownership is concentrated in the hands of the family group and members of the 
family are active in management and on the board of directors. This broad 
involvement by the controlling family group provides both benefits and costs to 
minority shareholders in family-owned companies relative to other companies. 
Benefits include the long-term view of wealth creation by the family group compared 
to the relatively short-term view of hired CEOs (James, 1999), the family’s superior 
knowledge and ability to monitor the operations of the company (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985), the presence of the family’s reputation capital that can result in a lower cost of 
debt (Anderson et al., 2003) and the ability of the family group to create more wealth 
through political connections than other owners (Faccio and Parsley, 2009). Costs 
include the increased incentive and opportunity of the family group to expropriate 
wealth from other shareholders. This can occur through excessive compensation, 
related party transactions, special dividends, risk avoidance and remaining active in 
management even when they are no longer competent to run the company (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003; Anderson et al., 2003). 
Generally, prior studies on family-owned companies have focused on the 
differences between family-owned and non-family-owned companies. The main areas 
of investigation being differences in firm performance and corporate governance 
practices. In early studies, family-owned companies were found to perform worse 
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than non-family-owned companies (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; Morck et al., 
2000). However, in later studies, Mishra et al. (2001) and Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
found that family-owned companies perform better than non-family-owned 
companies, especially when there is a founder CEO. Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
reconcile these conflicting results by showing that different relationships exist 
between family ownership, family control, family management and company 
performance. In essence, family ownership, control and management can have both 
benefits and costs to minority shareholders. 
Also corporate governance studies have focused on the differences between 
family-owned and non-family-owned companies. The results indicate that 
family-owned companies generally have weaker governance practices than other 
companies (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Chen et al., 2008; Nowland, 2008a), which 
could indicate that this is an intentional choice by the family group to maximize their 
consumption of private benefits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Dahya et al., 2008). In 
these situations, the general assumption is that more monitoring is required to protect 
the interests of minority shareholders.  
However, to our knowledge, no study has directly examined whether more 
monitoring is always in the best interests of minority shareholders. Theoretically, the 
optimal level of monitoring for minority shareholders is reached when the marginal 
benefit of additional monitoring equals the marginal cost. Since prior studies test for a 
linear relationship between monitoring variables (e.g. board independence) and firm 
performance, they implicitly assume that the optimal level of monitoring is at extreme 
levels of monitoring or that no optimal level exists. Corporate governance policies 
also assume that their prescribed recommendations are below the optimal level of 
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monitoring for minority shareholders. If not, they would result in a dead-weight loss 
for minority shareholders. 
 In this study we propose that the optimal level of monitoring in family-owned 
companies is at lower level than other companies. This is because the relative benefits 
and costs of monitoring to minority shareholders are different in family-owned 
companies. We focus on monitoring conducted by the board of directors as Fama and 
Jensen (1983) indicates that the board of directors is the major mechanism that 
minority shareholders possess to monitor the activities of corporate insiders. A 
number of studies show that other governance mechanisms (e.g. management 
compensation, takeover market) are less effective in aligning the interests of corporate 
insiders with outside investors in family-owned companies (Barclay and Holderness, 
1989; Kole, 1997; Shivdasani, 2003).  
We propose that the benefits of board monitoring are lower in family-owned 
companies for two reasons. First, the effectiveness of monitoring relies on access to 
information. A number of studies show that family-owned companies disclose less 
information to outside parties (external to the family) than other companies (Ali et al., 
2007; Chen et al., 2008; Nowland, 2008b). Based on this higher information 
asymmetry, we expect the monitoring conducted by outsiders (e.g. independent 
directors) to be less effective in family-owned companies than other companies. This 
means the appointment of an independent director in family-owned companies will 
reduce agency costs by a smaller amount than the appointment of an independent 
director in other companies.  
Second, in Asia in particular, the family group generally has substantial control 
or voting rights and dominates the board of directors (Claessens at al., 2000; Yeh and 
Woidtke, 2005). The family group, therefore, has the ability to appoint outside 
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directors that they favour. Therefore we expect that outside directors in family-owned 
companies are less likely to be truly independent of the family group and thereby are 
less effective independent monitors. Again, the result is that the same level of board 
monitoring results in a lower reduction in agency costs in family-owned companies 
relative to other companies.  
The costs of board monitoring are expected to be higher in family-owned 
companies for three reasons. First, recent studies comparing the performance of 
family-owned companies with other companies show that family-owned companies 
perform better than other companies (Mishra et al., 2001; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006). This has been attributed to the family group’s extensive 
knowledge of the firm’s operations, experience in running the company since its 
founding, and the family’s heightened interest in the success of the company due to 
their undiversified investment of reputation and monetary capital in the company 
(James, 1999; Anderson et al., 2003). In essence, family-owned companies are more 
effective at creating wealth than other companies. Adams and Ferreira (2007) show 
that increased monitoring activities hinder an effective management team’s ability to 
create wealth as time and resources are drawn away from wealth-creation activities to 
satisfy the needs of the additional monitoring. Therefore, for the same increase in 
monitoring, we expect the loss of wealth creation to be greater in family-owned 
companies.  
 Second, family-owned companies are also well known for creating wealth 
through undisclosable channels such as business and political relationships. Faccio 
and Parsley (2009) show that wealth creation through political connections is higher 
in family-owned companies than other companies. The benefits of these political 
connections include increased access to financing, lower effective tax rates and 
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increased market share (Faccio, 2006). Again, an increase in monitoring is expected to 
reduce the ability of companies to create wealth through these undisclosable channels. 
Therefore, for the same increase in monitoring, we expect the loss of wealth creation 
to be greater in family-owned companies. 
 Third, in family-owned companies a high level of external monitoring also can 
be unnecessary and costly. As the family group has been running the company since 
its founding and generally have representatives within different levels of management, 
they are in a unique position to effectively monitor the operations of the company 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). In addition, they can monitor the operations of the 
company at a much lower cost than other monitors due to their better understanding of 
the wealth-creation processes within the company and their better access to internal 
information (Raheja, 2005; Cai et al., 2007). While some monitoring by outsiders is 
needed to ensure the family group does not expropriate wealth from minority 
shareholders, too much monitoring will replicate the monitoring already being 
performed by the family group and add additional costs to the business. Therefore, the 
same increase in monitoring is expected to result in more redundant (unnecessary and 
costly) monitoring in family-owned companies. 
 In combination, the lower benefits and higher costs of board monitoring in 
family-owned companies mean that the optimal level of board monitoring in 
family-owned companies is expected to be at a lower level than in other companies. 
Therefore, at moderate levels of board monitoring we expect to find a concave or 
non-linear relationship (with identifiable maximum or optimal point) between board 
monitoring and firm performance for family-owned companies but not for other 
companies. This is displayed in Figure 1 and leads to our first testable hypothesis. 
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H1: At moderate levels of board monitoring, an optimal level of board 
monitoring exists for family-owned companies. 
 
In addition, as a number of recent studies show that company governance 
practices are endogenously determined based on firm-specific characteristics (Boone 
et al., 2008; Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008), we expect the optimal level of 
board monitoring to be sensitive to the magnitude of the agency conflict between the 
family group and minority shareholders. If the interests of the family group are 
closely aligned to those of minority shareholders, through higher cashflow rights 
ownership, then the optimal level of board monitoring is expected to be lower 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). If the family group is entrenched, through a high ratio of 
control to cashflow rights, then the optimal level of board monitoring is expected to 
be higher (Claessens et al., 2000; Yeh and Woidtke, 2005). Our second and third 
hypotheses are presented as follows. 
 
H2: The optimal level of board monitoring is lower at higher levels of family 
cashflow rights ownership. 
 
H3: The optimal level of board monitoring is higher when family control rights 
ownership exceeds cashflow rights ownership. 
 
The optimal level of monitoring required by minority shareholders in 
family-owned companies can also be influenced by the monitoring performed by 
other parties, such as the family group, equity blockholders and debtholders (Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Harvey et al., 
13 
 
2004). In this section we expect the optimal level of monitoring in family-owned 
companies to be lower when substitute monitoring is being performed by these other 
parties. Or conversely, the optimal level of monitoring will be higher when substitute 
monitoring is not being performed. Hypotheses four to six are therefore presented as 
follows. 
 
H4: The optimal level of board monitoring is lower when the family group is 
more involved in monitoring within the company. 
 
H5: The optimal level of board monitoring is lower when a 
non-management-related blockholder exists. 
 
H6: The optimal level of board monitoring is lower when companies have more 
debt. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
While we develop a general framework suited to all family-owned companies, we test 
our hypotheses using a specific sample of Asian companies in the period after the 
Asian crisis. This is because our fixed firm effect analysis necessitates a sample of 
companies that have experienced changes in monitoring practices over time. Our 
analysis also focuses on large and successful companies, as one of the desirable 
characteristics in finding an optimal level of monitoring is companies that have been 
successfully managed for an extended period of time. Therefore, to be included in the 
sample, companies are required to be top-100 non-financial companies in Hong Kong, 
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Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan, which have board governance, ownership and 
financial data available each year for the period 1998 to 2004. These countries were 
selected due to their widespread availability of board governance and ownership data 
over the entire sample period. They are also countries with a relatively high level of 
family ownership.  
The sample comprises a balanced panel of 185 companies and 1,295 firm-year 
observations from the four countries over the seven-year period. Of these, 100 are 
family-owned companies and the remaining 85 are non-family-owned firms. The 
breakdown between countries is 47 firms from Hong Kong, 58 firms from Malaysia, 
32 firms from Singapore and 48 firms from Taiwan. Companies are identified as 
family-owned if the largest ultimate shareholder is the family group that founded the 
company. The largest shareholders in the non-family-owned companies are either 
government entities, other widely-held companies or non-founders. Board governance 
and ownership data are hand collected from annual reports. Financial data is from 
Compustat.  
 
Variables 
The financial variables are defined as follows. Consistent with previous literature, our 
primary measure of firm performance is Tobin’s Q (Anderson and Reeb, 2004).  
Tobin’s Q ratios (TQ) are calculated as total assets minus the book value of equity 
plus the market value of equity all divided by total assets. However, as the raw 
Tobin’s Q ratios are truncated at zero and highly skewed, the natural logarithm of 
Tobin’s Q is used in the later analysis. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in 
billions of US dollars. Return on assets (ROA) and one-year sales growth 
(GROWTH) are percentages. Leverage (LEV) is the ratio of debt to total assets. Cash 
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rights (CASH) is the ultimate cash flow rights of the largest shareholding as a 
proportion of total shares outstanding. WEDGE is the ratio of control rights to 
cashflow rights of the largest shareholder following the methodology of Claessens et 
al. (2000). A WEDGE greater than one indicates the existence of pyramidal 
ownership structures or cross-holdings which allow owners to maintain control of the 
company through minimal cash flow rights ownership. BLOCK is a dummy variable 
equal to one if a non-management-related blockholder exists with ownership of 
greater than 10% of issued shares. 
The board monitoring variables are defined as follows. Board independence 
(BIND) is the proportion of independent directors on the board.3 Committee 
monitoring (COMM) is calculated as one point for each monitoring-related committee 
(audit, nomination and remuneration). Audit committee (AC), nomination committee 
(NC) and remuneration committee (RC) are dummy variables equal to one if these 
committees exist. Chairman/CEO split (CCSPLIT) is a dummy variable equal to one 
if these positions are not held by the same person. Board size (BSIZE) is the number 
of directors on the board.4 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the financial and board monitoring 
variables. Panel A indicates that family-owned companies have lower Tobin’s Q 
ratios than other companies. Also, family companies are bigger and have higher 
leverage than other companies. There are no significant differences across the 
measures of growth and return on assets. Consistent with the findings of Claessens et 
al. (2000), family owners are more likely to hold lower cashflow rights in their 
companies but to maintain control through control rights in excess of their cashflow 
rights (WEDGE). Other companies are more likely to have non-management-related 
blockholders than family-owned companies. These statistics show that family-owned 
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companies have different financial and ownership characteristics than other 
companies, which are controlled for through fixed firm effects and time-varying 
control variables in the multivariate models. 
Panel B shows that in all measures except for board size, family-owned 
companies have significantly lower levels of board monitoring than other companies. 
Board size is significantly higher in family-owned companies. This is also consistent 
with weaker board monitoring as Yermack (1996) shows that smaller boards are more 
effective monitors. These differences are consistent with previous research which 
reports that board governance practices are weaker in family-owned companies 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Chen et al., 2008; Nowland, 2008a).   
 Table 2 presents the correlations between the financial and board variables. The 
correlations between the financial and ownership variables are generally low and 
indicate that there are no multicollinearity concerns for the later multivariate analysis. 
The correlations between some of the individual committee variables reach a high of 
0.81, which is why we use a composite score of committee monitoring. The 
correlation between BIND and COMM is 0.65, which is expected as they are both 
proxying for the same construct of board monitoring.  
 
Model 
Our model relates the board monitoring variables to firm performance with the aim of 
identifying an optimal level of board monitoring in family-owned companies. The two 
board monitoring variables are board independence and committee monitoring. We 
also control for the monitoring effects of board size and separation of the Chairman 
and CEO positions (Yermack, 1996). Previous research shows that firm performance 
(proxied by Tobin’s Q) is related to company size, growth, return on assets, leverage 
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and ownership structure (La Porta et al., 2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Doidge et 
al., 2004; Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005). Therefore, control 
variables have been included in the model to control for these influences. The model 
relates the board monitoring measures to firm performance as follows: 
2
43
2
2it1it       )ln(TQ itititit COMMCOMMBINDBIND ββββα ++++=  
ititit GROWTHSIZEBSIZECCSPLIT 876it5    ββββ ++++     (1) 
ititititit WEDGECASHLEVROA εββββ +++++ 1211109  
where all variables are as previously defined. The squared terms are used to identify 
the optimal levels of monitoring. Fixed firm and period effects are used to control for 
omitted variable bias.  
 As fixed firm effects regressions are used in our models, sufficient temporal 
variation is needed in the board monitoring measures to avoid collinearity problems. 
Table 3, therefore, examines the temporal and cross-sectional variation in the board 
monitoring measures over the sample period. Panel A shows the average proportion 
of family-owned and other companies that made changes to their board monitoring 
measures each year (annual) and over the entire sample period (period). While few 
changes were made to some of the individual board monitoring measures (especially 
CCSPLIT and AC), between 41% and 80% of the companies made changes to their 
board independence and committee monitoring score over the period 1998 to 2004. 
Annual changes in these measures also ranged from 9% to 28% of companies. We 
believe that these temporal changes are sufficient to eliminate collinearity concerns in 
the following analysis.  
Panel B shows the cross-sectional variation in the board measures in 2004. The 
minimum and maximum values for each measure are presented to show that there is 
still substantial variation in board monitoring practices across companies at the end of 
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the sample period. This variation across companies increases the probability of 
finding an optimal level of board monitoring in the multivariate analysis. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Optimal Board Monitoring 
Table 4 presents the results of the model for our sample of family-owned companies 
and other companies. Regressions (1) and (2) show the results for family-owned 
companies, while regressions (3) and (4) display the results for other companies. The 
regressions of the two groups are not combined as fixed firm effects are used and a 
family company dummy variable would be time invariant, resulting in perfect 
multicollinearity.  
In regression (1) the positive coefficients on BIND and COMM and negative 
coefficients on BIND2 and COMM2 indicate that non-linear or concave relationships 
exist between board independence and firm performance, and committee monitoring 
and firm performance in family-owned companies. This concave relationship means 
that it is possible to identify a maximum or optimal level of board monitoring that 
equates to the highest level of firm performance. To identify the maximum or optimal 
level we solve for the first derivative of performance with respect to each of the board 
monitoring variables. The results show that firm performance is highest in 
family-owned companies when board independence is 38 percent and the committee 
monitoring score is 2.2.5 The positive coefficient on CCSPLIT indicates that 
separating the Chairman and CEO positions is preferable. The coefficient on BSIZE is 
insignificant. To understand the composition of the committee monitoring score, 
regression (2) breaks this score into its components (AC, NC and RC). The results 
show that both AC and RC have significant positive relationships with firm 
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performance. This indicates that the creation of audit and remuneration committees is 
preferable. Other results are consistent with the first regression. 
In regression (3) both board independence and committee monitoring are found 
to have no relationship with firm performance in non-family-owned companies. 
However, the positive coefficient on CCSPLIT indicates that separating the Chairman 
and CEO positions is preferable. The coefficient on BSIZE is insignificant. In 
regression (4) the committee monitoring score is broken into its components and the 
results show a positive relationship between RC and firm performance. This indicates 
that the creation of remuneration committees is preferable in non-family-owned 
companies. Other results are consistent with the third regression.  
The results for the control variables are generally consistent with previous 
research (La Porta et al., 2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Doidge et al., 2004; 
Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005). We find positive relationships 
between growth, return on assets and performance, and a negative relationship 
between leverage and performance in family-owned companies. We find a negative 
relationship between firm size and performance, and a positive relationship between 
the control wedge and performance in other companies. The positive relationship 
between the control wedge and performance suggests that some entrenchment of the 
largest owner is beneficial in non-family-owned companies. This is somewhat 
unexpected as entrenchment is generally seen as increasing agency costs in 
family-owned companies. It may indicate that entrenchment for non-family 
controlling owners helps them to manage the company with less interference and 
without the increase in agency costs seen in family-owned companies. The 
explanatory power of the model is high across the four regressions due to the 
inclusion of fixed company effects. 
20 
 
These results indicate that hypothesis one is supported – at moderate levels of 
board monitoring, an optimal level of board monitoring exists in family-owned 
companies but not in other companies. In family-owned companies this equates to 
board independence of 38 percent, separation of the Chairman and CEO positions and 
the establishment of audit and remuneration committees. In non-family-owned 
companies, performance is highest when the Chairman and CEO positions are split 
and a remuneration committee exists. These results are consistent with expectations as 
family-owned companies are the type of company expected to have a lower optimal 
level of monitoring. 
The insignificant result for other companies could be due to a number of reasons. 
First, this group contains companies with a number of different ownership types, all of 
which may have different optimal monitoring structures. Therefore by combining 
them together it is not possible to find a clear result. This is left to future research to 
explore. Second, consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) it is possible that 
each individual firm has maintained its own optimal level of monitoring throughout 
the period. Under this explanation, as there were few firms moving up to and away 
from their optimal levels, it would be difficult to identify an optimal level of 
monitoring in the group. Also another potential explanation is that there were not 
enough temporal changes in the monitoring variables in the non-family-owned 
company group to identify an optimal level of monitoring. However, the statistics in 
Table 3 show that there were generally more temporal changes in the monitoring 
variables for other companies than for family-owned companies. Therefore this 
explanation is unlikely to be true. 
Furthermore, it is possible to compare our results to the US results of Anderson 
and Reeb (2004). They found that performance is highest in US family-owned 
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companies when the board contains two independent directors for each family 
representative. In other words, performance is highest at board independence of 67 
percent. Our results show that performance is highest in Asian family-owned 
companies when board independence is 38 percent. This suggests that the costs and 
benefits of monitoring in Asian family-owned companies are substantially different to 
their US counterparts. It appears that the greater agency costs from the higher control 
rights wedge in Asia are more than offset by the higher costs of monitoring from 
wealth-creation through activities such as political connections. 
Finally, the optimal level of monitoring that we identify for family-owned 
companies in this section can only be regarded as an average result across the group 
of family-owned companies. The following sections separate the family-owned 
companies into different sub-groups where we expect to find higher or lower optimal 
levels of monitoring depending on firm characteristics. 
 
Aligned versus Entrenched Family Owners 
The optimal level of monitoring in family-owned companies is expected to be lower 
when the interests of the family group and other shareholders are better aligned 
through higher cashflow rights ownership and higher when the family group is 
entrenched through a ratio of control rights to cashflow rights ownership of greater 
than one.  
 Table 5 presents the results for this analysis of family-owned companies. 
Regressions (1) and (2) present the results for family-owned companies with cashflow 
rights higher and lower than the median of 0.24. In the first regression (high cash 
rights), concave relationships are found between board independence and firm 
performance, and committee monitoring and firm performance. A positive 
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relationship is also found between CCSPLIT and firm performance. Again, to identify 
the maximum or optimal level we solve for the first derivative of performance with 
respect to each of the board monitoring variables. The optimal levels of monitoring 
equate to board independence of 29% and a committee monitoring score of 1.8. In the 
second regression (low cash rights), there are no significant relationships between the 
monitoring variables and firm performance, meaning that optimal levels of monitoring 
could not be identified. These results support hypothesis two and show that when the 
interests of the family group and minority shareholders are better aligned through 
higher cashflow rights ownership, the optimal level of board monitoring (board 
independence and committee monitoring) is lower than the average result for all 
family-owned companies in the sample.6 
Regressions (3) and (4) present the results for family-owned companies that are 
entrenched, through a ratio of control to cash flow rights of greater than one (control 
wedge), and not entrenched, a ratio of control to cash flow rights of one (no control 
wedge). In the third regression (control wedge), a concave relationship is found 
between board independence and firm performance, which equates to optimal board 
independence of 44%. In the fourth regression (no control wedge), there are no 
significant relationships between board independence, committee monitoring and firm 
performance, meaning that optimal levels of monitoring could not be identified. 
However, a positive relationship is found between CCSPLIT and firm performance 
and a negative relationship between BSIZE and firm performance. The results support 
hypothesis three and show that when the family group is entrenched through a ratio of 
control to cashflow rights of greater than one, the optimal level of board monitoring 
(board independence) is higher than the result for all family-owned companies. 
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Substitute Monitoring 
The optimal level of monitoring required by minority shareholders in family-owned 
companies can also be influenced by the monitoring performed by other parties, such 
as the family group, equity blockholders and debtholders. 
Table 6 presents the results of this analysis. Regressions (1) and (2) present the 
results for family-owned companies when the family group is more and less involved 
in monitoring within the company. More involved means that members of the family 
group hold both the Chairman and CEO positions and, therefore, are actively involved 
in both running and monitoring the operations of the company.7 Less involved means 
the family group holds only one or neither of these positions and indicates that they 
are less involved in running and monitoring the operations of the company. In the first 
regression (family more involved), concave relationships are found between board 
independence and firm performance, and committee monitoring and firm 
performance. A positive relationship is also found between CCSPLIT and firm 
performance. In this regression, the optimal points equate to board independence of 
30% and a committee monitoring score of 2.2. In the second regression (family less 
involved), a concave relationship is found between board independence and firm 
performance, which equates to optimal board independence of 44%. These results 
support hypothesis four and show that when the family group is more (less) involved 
in running and monitoring the operations of the company, the optimal level of 
monitoring (board independence) is lower (higher).  
Regressions (3) and (4) present the results for family-owned companies with and 
without a non-management-related blockholder who owns 10% or more in issued 
shares. In the third regression (blockholder), there are no significant relationships 
between board independence, committee monitoring and firm performance, meaning 
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that optimal levels of monitoring could not be identified. However, a positive 
relationship is found between CCSPLIT and firm performance. In the fourth 
regression (no blockholder), concave relationships are found between board 
independence and firm performance, and committee monitoring and firm performance. 
A positive relationship is also found between CCSPLIT and firm performance. In this 
regression, the optimal points equate to board independence of 39% and a committee 
monitoring score of 2.0. However, as these results are similar to the results for the 
complete group of family-owned companies, they indicate that blockholders may not 
be performing a monitoring function or that minority shareholders do not believe they 
are monitoring in the interests of all shareholders. There is, therefore, little support for 
hypothesis five.  
Regressions (5) and (6) present the results for family-owned companies with 
leverage ratios higher and lower than the median of 0.25. In the fifth regression (more 
debt), a positive relationship is found between board independence and firm 
performance. No other relationships are significant. In the sixth regression (less debt), 
concave relationships are found between board independence and firm performance, 
and committee monitoring and firm performance. A positive relationship is found 
between CCSPLIT and firm performance and a negative relationship between BSIZE 
and firm performance. In this regression, the optimal points equate to board 
independence of 41% and a committee monitoring score of 2.1. These results support 
hypothesis six and show that when family-owned companies have less debt, i.e. when 
there is less substitute monitoring by debtholders, the optimal level of board 
monitoring (board independence) is higher than the result for all family-owned 
companies. 
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Robustness Checks 
A number of robustness check have been undertaken to ensure the reliability of the 
results. First, we conducted piece-wise regressions to ensure that we have correctly 
identified the optimal level of board monitoring in family-owned companies. The 
results confirm that a positive relationship exists between board independence and 
performance up to board independence of 38 percent and that a negative relationship 
exists between board independence and performance when board independence is 
greater than 38 percent. Similarly, for committee monitoring a positive relationship 
was found up to two monitoring-related committees and a negative relationship after 
two committees.  
Second, an alternative measure of firm performance (return on assets) was used 
to confirm the reported results. Using return on assets in place of the Tobin’s Q ratio 
produces consistent results. An optimal level of board monitoring is found for 
family-owned companies but not for other companies. This equates to board 
independence of 38%. When the interests of the family group are better aligned 
through higher cashflow rights ownership, optimal board independence drops to 31%. 
When family owners are entrenched through a ratio of control to cashflow rights of 
greater than one, optimal board independence increases to 44%.  
 Third, our analysis suggests that the direction of causality runs from the board 
monitoring measures to firm performance. To overcome reverse causality concerns, 
further analysis was conducted relating lagged board monitoring variables to firm 
performance. The results are consistent with those previously presented. In particular, 
concave relationships exist between lagged board independence and firm 
performance, and lagged committee monitoring and firm performance for 
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family-owned but not for other companies. No significant relationships we found 
when we related board monitoring variables to lagged performance measures. 
 Fourth, to ensure the results were not biased by companies from any of the four 
countries in the sample, the models were also run on subsets of the countries. As there 
is not sufficient data to run individual regressions for each country, we excluded the 
countries one at a time from the regressions. The results are consistent with those 
already presented. For family-owned companies, optimal board independence ranged 
from 35% to 39% and the optimal committee monitoring ranged from 1.8 to 2.4 for 
these subsets. Finally, the results are also robust to using raw Tobin’s Q ratios rather 
than the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable in the regressions. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Generally, corporate governance theory assumes that increased monitoring of 
management is always favourable to minority shareholders. However, in this study, 
we examine whether increased monitoring is always in the best interests of minority 
shareholders. In family-owned companies, where the family group have a long record 
of successfully managing the company and where wealth is often created through 
undisclosable channels such as political connections, we find that too much 
monitoring is detrimental to company performance. This is because too much 
monitoring interferes with the ability of the family group to create wealth for all 
shareholders. 
 We show that at moderate levels of board monitoring, an optimal level of 
monitoring exists in family-owned companies that satisfies minority shareholders. At 
low levels of monitoring, increased monitoring is preferred as this reduces the conflict 
of interest between the family group and minority shareholders. However, this is only 
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up to the optimal level of monitoring. At higher levels of monitoring, the marginal 
benefit from reducing the agency conflict between the family group and minority 
shareholders is outweighed by the cost of reduced wealth creation for all shareholders.  
 In this study we examine the board monitoring practices of a sample of Asian 
companies over the period 1998 to 2004. Fixed effects regressions are used to control 
for omitted variable bias. We find concave relationships between board independence 
and firm performance, and committee monitoring and firm performance for 
family-owned companies but not for other companies. The optimal level of board 
monitoring for our sample of Asian family-owned companies equates to board 
independence of 38%, separation of the Chairman and CEO positions and 
establishment of audit and remuneration committees.  
Further investigation reveals that the optimal level of monitoring is lower when 
the interests of the family group and minority shareholders are better aligned and 
when the family group is more involved in running the company (is undertaking more 
monitoring itself). The optimal level of monitoring is higher when the family group is 
entrenched and when there is less substitute monitoring by debtholders. In comparing 
our results to those of Anderson and Reeb (2004), we find that the optimal level of 
board independence for family-owned companies is lower in Asia. This suggests that 
the costs and benefits of monitoring in Asian family-owned companies are 
substantially different to those of their US counterparts.  
 The results have a number of implications. First, companies with different 
ownership and control structures can have different optimal levels of monitoring. 
Therefore it may be inappropriate for regulators to advise all companies to follow the 
same set of corporate governance guidelines. In particular, corporate governance 
guidelines designed for widely-held companies may need to be modified for 
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family-owned companies as more monitoring is not always associated with better 
performance. Second, the optimal level of monitoring varies within ownership types 
depending on the severity of the agency conflicts between owners. In family-owned 
companies, monitoring needs to be higher when family owners maintain control of their 
companies through control rights in excess of their cashflow rights.  
 From a practical perspective, the optimal level of board governance in our sample 
of Asian family-owned companies is identified at a level higher than actual practices. 
For example, family-owned companies have an average board independence of 23% 
but the optimal level is found to be 38%. Therefore it does seem that family-owned 
companies as a group are refusing to adopt monitoring practices in the best interests of 
minority shareholders.  
 Finally, in this study, two limitations are acknowledged. First, the analysis focuses 
on the largest and most successful companies. Therefore while the optimal levels of 
monitoring identified in this study may be generalizable to other large family-owned 
companies in similar markets around the world, they may not be generalizable to 
smaller family-owned companies. Second, the non-family-owned company group 
contains companies with different ownership structures. We do not find an optimal 
level of monitoring for this group of companies. Therefore, further research is needed 
to divide the group of non-family-owned companies into different sub-groups and to 
investigate optimal levels of monitoring for these sub-groups. This study shows that a 
“one size fits all” approach is unlikely to be suitable for all types of companies. So 
more research is needed to determine what types of practices are optimal for different 
types of companies.    
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ENDNOTES 
1
 Hong Kong’s original code was introduced in 1993, with a revised corporate governance code 
effective 2005. Malaysia’s corporate governance codes was introduced in 2000, Singapore in 2001 and 
Taiwan in 2002. 
2
 For example, while some small companies have been granted exemptions from the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act requirements (Gao et al., 2009), there have been no exemptions for companies with different 
ownership structures or for foreign companies.  
3
 Independent directors are those highlighted as “independent” in the companies’ annual reports. 
4
 In Taiwan, supervisors were not counted as directors.  
5
 These optimal points are found by solving the first derivative of performance with respect to the 
monitoring variables. For BIND this equals 1.1969/(2x1.5874) = 0.38. For COMM this equals 
0.2391/(2x0.0555) = 2.2. 
6
 The board independence result of 0.29 is lower than the full sample result of 0.38. The committee 
monitoring score of 1.8 is lower than the full sample result of 2.2. Again it is not possible to run the 
two regressions together to test for significant differences between the two groups as a dummy variable 
separating the two groups would be time-invariant and result in perfect multicollinearity with the fixed 
firm effects.  
7
 This is different to the CCSPLIT variable, which signifies that the same person holding both positions 
would be too much concentration of power. 
 
 
30 
 
REFERENCES 
Adams, R. and D. Ferreira, 2007, A theory of friendly boards, Journal of Finance, 62, 
217-250. 
Ali, A., T.Y. Chen and S. Radhakrishnan, 2007, Corporate disclosures by family 
firms, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 44, 238-286. 
Anderson, R. and D. Reeb, 2003, Founding-family ownership and firm performance: 
Evidence from the S&P 500, Journal of Finance, 58, 1301– 1327. 
Anderson, R. and D. Reeb, 2004, Board composition: Balancing family influence in 
S&P500 firms, Administrative Sciences Quarterly, 49, 209-237. 
Anderson, R., S. Mansi and D. Reeb, 2003, Founding family ownership and the agency 
costs of debt, Journal of Financial Economics, 68, 263-285.  
Barclay, M. and C. Holderness, 1989, Private benefits from control of public 
corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 25, 371-396. 
Boone, A.L., L.C. Field, J.M. Karpoff and C.G. Raheja, 2008, The determinants of 
corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 85, 66-101. 
Berle, A. and G. Means, 1932, The modern corporate and private property, London: 
Transaction Publishers. 
Cai, J., Y. Liu and Y Qian, 2007, Information asymmetry and corporate governance, 
SSRN working paper. 
Chen, S., X. Chen and Q. Cheng, 2008, Do family firms provide more or less 
voluntary disclosure? Journal of Accounting Research, 46, 499-536. 
Claessens, S., S. Djankov and L. Lang, 2000, The separation of ownership and control 
in East Asian corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 81-112. 
31 
 
Coles, J.L., N.D. Daniel and L. Naveen, 2008, Boards: Does one size fit all?, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 87, 329-356. 
Dahya, J., O. Dimitrov and J. McConnell, 2008, Dominant shareholders, corporate 
boards and corporate value: A cross-country analysis, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 87, 73-100. 
Demsetz, H. and K. Lehn, 1985, The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and 
consequences, Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155-1177. 
Doidge, C., G. A. Karolyi and R. Stulz, 2004, Why are foreign firms listed in the U.S. 
worth more?, Journal of Financial Economics, 71, 205 - 238. 
Durnev, A. and E.H. Kim, 2005, To steal or not to steal – Firm attributes, legal 
environment and valuations, Journal of Finance, 60, 1461 - 1493. 
Faccio, M., 2006, Characteristics of politically connected firms, SSRN working paper. 
Faccio, M. and L. Lang, 2002, The ultimate ownership of Western European 
corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 65, 365-395. 
Faccio, M. and D. Parsley, 2009, Sudden deaths: Taking stock of geographic ties, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 44, forthcoming. 
Fama, E. and M. Jensen, 1983, Separation of ownership and control, Journal of Law 
and Economics, 26, 301-325. 
Gao, F., J.S. Wu and J. Zimmerman, 2009, Unintended consequences of granting 
small firms exemptions from securities regulation: Evidence from 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Journal of Accounting Research, 47, 459-506. 
Harvey, C., K. Lins and A. Roper, 2004, The effect of capital structure when expected 
agency costs are extreme, Journal of Financial Economics, 74, 3-30. 
32 
 
Hermalin, B. and M. Weisbach, 2003, Board of directors as an endogenously 
determined institution: A survey of the economic literature, Economic Policy 
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, April, 7-26. 
Holderness, C. and D. Sheehan, 1988, The role of majority shareholders in publicly 
held corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 317-346. 
James, H., 1999, Owner and manager, extended horizons and the family firm, 
International Journal of the Economics of Business, 6, 41-56. 
Jensen, M. and W. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency 
costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 306-360. 
Klapper, L. F. and I. Love, 2004, Corporate governance, investor protection and 
performance in emerging markets, Journal of Corporate Finance 10, 703–728. 
Kole, S., 1997, The complexity of compensation contracts, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 43, 79-104. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, 2002, Investor 
protection and corporate valuation, Journal of Finance, 57, 1147 – 1170. 
Lane, S., J. Astrachan, A. Keyt and K. McMillan, 2006, Guidelines for family 
business boards of directors, Family Business Review, 19, 147-167. 
Linck, J.S., J.M. Netter and T. Yang, 2008, The determinants of board structure, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 87, 308-328. 
Maury, B. and A. Pajuste, 2005, Multiple large shareholders and firm value, Journal 
of Banking and Finance, 29, 1813-1834. 
Mishra, C., T. Randoy and J. Jenssen, 2001, The effect of founding family influence 
on firm value and corporate governance, Journal of International Financial 
Management and Accounting, 12-3, 235-259. 
33 
 
Morck, R., D. Strangeland and B. Yeung, 2000, Inherited wealth, corporate control 
and economic growth: The Canadian disease? In: R. Morck, Concentrated 
corporate ownership, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 319-369. 
Nowland, J., 2008a, Are East Asian companies benefiting from western board 
practices, Journal of Business Ethics, 79, 133-150. 
Nowland, J., 2008b, The effect of national governance codes on company disclosure 
practices: Evidence from analyst earnings forecasts, Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 16-6, 475-491. 
Raheja, C., 2005, Determinant of board size and composition: A theory of corporate 
boards, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 40, 283-306. 
Shivdasani, A., 2003, Board composition, ownership structure and hostile takeovers, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16, 167-198. 
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny, 1986, Large shareholders and corporate control, Journal of 
Political Economy, 95, 461-488.  
Villalonga, B. and R. Amit, 2006, How do family ownership, management and 
control affect firm value?, Journal of Financial Economics, 80, 385-417. 
Yeh, Y.H. and T. Woidtke, 2005, Commitment of entrenchment?: Controlling 
shareholders and board composition, Journal of Banking and Finance, 29, 
1857-1885. 
Yermack, D., 1996, Higher valuation of companies with a small board of directors, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 40, 185-211. 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Optimal Relationship between Board Monitoring and 
Firm Performance in Family-Owned Companies
Board Monitoring (moderate levels)
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A – Financial Variables 
 Family Companies Other Companies Difference 
in means 
 Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
TQ 1.49 0.47 11.98 1.74 0.48 10.57 -0.25** 
Log(TQ) 0.26 -0.75 2.48 0.37 -0.74 2.36 -0.11** 
SIZE 7.22 3.79 11.31 7.06 3.10 10.69 0.16* 
GROWTH 17.34 -65.72 3867.93 13.45 -69.41 726.36 3.89 
ROA 8.52 -73.69 102.91 9.21 -20.31 152.35 -0.69 
LEV 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.00 0.71 0.02* 
CASH 0.28 0.02 0.75 0.43 0.01 0.86 -0.17** 
WEDGE 1.56 1.00 6.39 1.09 1.00 2.60 0.47** 
BLOCK 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.00 1.00   -0.04† 
       
       
Panel B – Board Monitoring Variables    
 Family Companies Other Companies Difference 
in means 
 Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
BIND 0.23 0.00 0.75 0.34 0.00 0.92 -0.11** 
COMM 1.01 0.00 3.00 1.59 0.00 3.00 -0.58** 
AC 0.63 0.00 1.00 0.80 0.00 1.00 -0.17** 
NC 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 -0.19** 
RC 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.43 0.00 1.00 -0.21** 
CCSPLIT 0.72 0.00 1.00 0.88 0.00 1.00 -0.16** 
BSIZE 10.01 3.00 21.00 9.66 5.00 25.00   0.35† 
 
Notes: Tobin’s Q ratios (TQ) are calculated as total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity all divided 
by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in millions of US dollars. Return on assets (ROA) and one-year sales 
growth (GROWTH) are percentages. Leverage (LEV) is the ratio of debt to total assets. Cash Rights (CASH) is the ultimate 
percentage shareholding of the largest shareholder. WEDGE is the ratio of control rights to cashflow rights of the largest shareholder 
following the methodology of Claessens et al. (2000). BLOCK is a dummy variable equal to one if a non-management-related 
blockholder exists with ownership of greater than 10% of issued shares. Board independence (BIND) is the proportion of independent 
directors on the board. Committee monitoring (COMM) is calculated as one point for each monitoring-related committee (audit, 
nomination and remuneration). Chairman/CEO split (CCSPLIT) is a dummy variable equal to one if the positions are split. Audit 
committee (AC), nomination committee (NC) and remuneration committee (RC) are dummy variables equal to one if these 
committees exist. Board size (BSIZE) is the number of directors on the board. Data is from Compustat and annual reports. 
Significance levels for means tests are denoted by 1% **, 5% *, 10% †. 
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TABLE 2 
Correlations 
 
 Log(TQ) SIZE GROWTH ROA LEV CASH WEDGE BLOCK BIND COMM CCSPLIT AC NC RC 
SIZE -0.24**              
GROWTH 0.15** 0.01             
ROA 0.53** -0.19** 0.37**            
LEV -0.26** 0.31** 0.01 -0.31**           
CASH -0.05 0.06* -0.03 -0.03 -0.17**          
WEDGE -0.08 0.07* -0.01 -0.02 0.09 -0.44**         
BLOCK -0.03 -0.22** 0.01 -0.04* 0.01 -0.11** 0.07*        
BIND -0.03 -0.09* -0.05 -0.01 -0.09** 0.32** -0.13** 0.13**       
COMM -0.07* -0.13** -0.05 -0.02 -0.10** 0.27** -0.09 0.19** 0.65**      
CCSPLIT 0.01 -0.09* -0.05 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.02 0.35**     
AC -0.10* -0.14** -0.02 -0.03 -0.15** 0.42** -0.08 0.20** 0.73** 0.65** -0.06*    
NC -0.05 -0.10* -0.03 -0.01 -0.08 0.15** -0.07 0.15** 0.44** 0.83** 0.05 0.36**   
RC -0.04 -0.05* -0.04 -0.01 -0.11** 0.13** -0.06 0.10** 0.52** 0.86** 0.05 0.43** 0.81**  
BSIZE -0.19** 0.46** -0.02 -0.13** 0.14* 0.02 0.16** -0.07 -0.11** -0.01 0.05* 0.05 -0.06* -0.04 
 
Notes: Tobin’s Q ratios (TQ) are calculated as total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity all divided by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in millions of US 
dollars. Return on assets (ROA) and one-year sales growth (GROWTH) are percentages. Leverage (LEV) is the ratio of debt to total assets. Cash Rights (CASH) is the ultimate percentage shareholding of the largest 
shareholder. WEDGE is the ratio of control rights to cashflow rights of the largest shareholder following the methodology of Claessens et al. (2000). BLOCK is a dummy variable equal to one if a 
non-management-related blockholder exists with ownership of greater than 10% of issued shares. Board independence (BIND) is the proportion of independent directors on the board. Chairman/CEO split 
(CCSPLIT) is a dummy variable equal to one if the positions are split. Audit committee (AC), nomination committee (NC) and remuneration committee (RC) are dummy variables equal to one if these committees 
exist. Committee monitoring (COMM) is calculated as one point for each monitoring-related committee (audit, nomination and remuneration). Board size (BSIZE) is the number of directors on the board. Data is 
from Compustat and annual reports. Significance levels are denoted by 1% **, 5% *, 10% †. 
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TABLE 3 
Variation in Board Monitoring Variables 
 
Panel A – Temporal Variation 
 Family Companies Other Companies 
 Annual Period Annual Period 
BIND 0.22 0.59 0.28 0.80 
COMM 0.09 0.41 0.17 0.67 
AC 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.11 
NC 0.04 0.30 0.09 0.60 
RC 0.05 0.33 0.07 0.51 
CCSPLIT 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.12 
BSIZE 0.25 0.64 0.27 0.79 
 
 
Panel B – Cross-sectional Variation 
 Family Companies Other Companies 
 Min Max Min Max 
BIND 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.92 
COMM 0.00 3.00 0.00 3.00 
AC 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
NC 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
RC 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
CCSPLIT 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
BSIZE 4.00 21.00 5.00 22.00 
 
Notes: Panel A refers to proportion of companies with a change in the specific board monitoring variable annually and over 
the entire sample period. Panel B shows the minimum and maximum for each variable in 2004. Board independence 
(BIND) is the proportion of independent directors on the board. Committee monitoring (COMM) is calculated as one point 
for each monitoring-related committee (audit, nomination and remuneration). Audit committee (AC), nomination 
committee (NC) and remuneration committee (RC) are dummy variables equal to one if these committees exist. 
Chairman/CEO split (CCSPLIT) is a dummy variable equal to one if the positions are split. Board size (BSIZE) is the 
number of directors on the board. Data is from annual reports.  
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TABLE 4 
Fixed Effects Regressions of Firm Performance and Board Monitoring 
 
 Log(Tobin’s Q) 
 Family Companies Other Companies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0.4731 (0.32) 
0.5019 
(0.29) 
0.5066 
(0.26) 
0.4939 
(0.28) 
BIND 1.1969** (0.01) 
1.1815** 
(0.02) 
-0.3800 
(0.44) 
-0.3843 
(0.43) 
BIND2 -1.5874** (0.02) 
-1.5395** 
(0.02) 
0.4621 
(0.39) 
0.5012 
(0.35) 
COMM 0.2391** (0.00)  
0.0270 
(0.80)  
COMM2 -0.0555** (0.00)  
0.0075 
(0.79)  
AC  0.1495* (0.02)  
-0.0091 
(0.93) 
NC  -0.0563 (0.25)  
0.0243 
(0.62) 
RC  0.0918
† 
(0.07)  
0.0927† 
(0.07) 
CCSPLIT 0.1068
† 
(0.07) 
0.1061† 
(0.07) 
0.1349** 
(0.00) 
0.1336** 
(0.00) 
BSIZE -0.0108 (0.34) 
-0.0107 
(0.34) 
-0.0026 
(0.79) 
-0.0018 
(0.86) 
SIZE -0.0424 (0.40) 
-0.0421 
(0.40) 
-0.1218* 
(0.02) 
-0.1196* 
(0.02) 
GROWTH 0.0002
† 
(0.07) 
0.0002† 
(0.07) 
-0.0004 
(0.25) 
-0.0005 
(0.23) 
ROA 0.0090** (0.00) 
0.0089** 
(0.00) 
0.0047 
(0.32) 
0.0048 
(0.32) 
LEV -0.2940* (0.04) 
-0.2949* 
(0.04) 
-0.0069 
(0.97) 
-0.0083 
(0.96) 
CASH 0.2289 (0.66) 
0.2181 
(0.68) 
0.3651 
(0.14) 
0.3699 
(0.13) 
WEDGE -0.1408 (0.13) 
-0.1455 
(0.12) 
0.3954* 
(0.02) 
0.4087* 
(0.02) 
Adj-R2 0.7725 0.7716 0.8203 0.8203 
n 700 700 595 595 
Notes: Fixed effects regressions of firm value (Tobin’s Q) on board monitoring and control variables. Tobin’s Q ratios (TQ) 
are calculated as total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity all divided by total assets. Board 
independence (BIND) is the proportion of independent directors on the board. Committee monitoring (COMM) is calculated 
as one point for each monitoring-related committee (audit, nomination and remuneration). Audit committee (AC), nomination 
committee (NC) and remuneration committee (RC) are dummy variables equal to one if these committees exist. 
Chairman/CEO split (CCSPLIT) is a dummy variable equal to one if the positions are split. Board size (BSIZE) is the number 
of directors on the board. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in millions of US dollars. Return on assets (ROA) and 
one-year sales growth (GROWTH) are percentages. Leverage (LEV) is the ratio of debt to total assets. Cash Rights (CASH) is 
the ultimate cashflow rights of the largest shareholder. WEDGE is the ratio of control rights to cashflow rights of the largest 
shareholder. Data is from Compustat and annual reports. Regressions include firm and period fixed effects. P-values are in 
parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by 1% **, 5% *, 10% †. 
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TABLE 5 
Aligned versus Entrenched Family Owners 
 
 Log(Tobin’s Q) 
 
High 
cash rights 
Low  
cash rights Control wedge 
No control 
wedge 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -1.9186 (0.45) 
2.1824** 
(0.00) 
0.4376 
(0.58) 
1.1306* 
(0.02) 
BIND 1.5373
† 
(0.07) 
0.6524 
(0.34) 
2.7858** 
(0.00) 
0.6033 
(0.27) 
BIND2 -2.6250* (0.03) 
-0.1818 
(0.84) 
-3.1652** 
(0.01) 
-0.8007 
(0.34) 
COMM 0.2170** (0.01) 
0.2060 
(0.18) 
0.1714 
(0.14) 
0.1339 
(0.21) 
COMM2 -0.0618** (0.00) 
-0.0333 
(0.38) 
-0.0420 
(0.14) 
-0.0316 
(0.24) 
CCSPLIT 0.1271
† 
(0.07) 
-0.0589 
(0.51) 
-0.0285 
(0.84) 
0.1975** 
(0.00) 
BSIZE -0.0006 (0.97) 
-0.0114 
(0.37) 
0.0248 
(0.13) 
-0.0224† 
(0.07) 
SIZE -0.0007 (0.99) 
-0.1953** 
(0.00) 
-0.0292 
(0.60) 
-0.1680** 
(0.00) 
GROWTH 0.0002 (0.14) 
0.0022** 
(0.00) 
-0.0004** 
(0.00) 
0.0014† 
(0.09) 
ROA 0.0102** (0.01) 
0.0050 
(0.15) 
0.0032 
(0.28) 
0.0173** 
(0.00) 
LEV -0.2668 (0.22) 
-0.5880** 
(0.00) 
0.2092 
(0.32) 
-0.3823* 
(0.04) 
CASH -0.3197 (0.52) 
-0.6801 
(0.45) 
-1.0313 
(0.40) 
0.5763 
(0.29) 
WEDGE 1.7132 (0.44) 
-0.2033* 
(0.05) 
-0.2099† 
(0.08)  
Adj-R2 0.8432 0.6686 0.7047 0.8467 
n 350 350 331 369 
 
Notes: Fixed effects regressions of firm value (Tobin’s Q) on board monitoring and control variables for family-owned 
companies. High cash rights means cashflow rights higher than the median (aligned). Low cash rights means cashflow rights 
lower than the median (not aligned). Control wedge means ratio of control to cashflow rights of greater than one (entrenched). 
No control wedge means a ratio of one (not entrenched) Tobin’s Q ratios (TQ) are calculated as total assets minus the book 
value of equity plus the market value of equity all divided by total assets. Board independence (BIND) is the proportion of 
independent directors on the board. Committee monitoring (COMM) is calculated as one point for each monitoring-related 
committee (audit, nomination and remuneration). Chairman/CEO split (CCSPLIT) is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
positions are split. Board size (BSIZE) is the number of directors on the board. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in 
millions of US dollars. Return on assets (ROA) and one-year sales growth (GROWTH) are percentages. Leverage (LEV) is 
the ratio of debt to total assets. Cash Rights (CASH) is the ultimate cashflow rights of the largest shareholder. WEDGE is the 
ratio of control rights to cashflow rights of the largest shareholder. Data is from Compustat and annual reports. Regressions 
include firm and period fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by 1% **, 5% *, 10% †. 
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TABLE 6 
Substitute Monitoring 
 
 Log(Tobin’s Q) 
 Family More 
Involved 
Family Less 
Involved Blockholder 
No 
Blockholder More Debt Less Debt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 1.3090* (0.05) 
-0.0605 
(0.90) 
-0.6434 
(0.61) 
0.8762 
(0.11) 
1.0305* 
(0.04) 
0.3898 
(0.65) 
BIND 1.6286* (0.03) 
1.2893† 
(0.07) 
-0.2364 
(0.82) 
1.8244** 
(0.00) 
1.0492† 
(0.08) 
2.0885* 
(0.03) 
BIND2 -2.6934* (0.02) 
-1.4593† 
(0.10) 
0.1239 
(0.92) 
-2.3449* 
(0.02) 
-1.5127 
(0.12) 
-2.5246* 
(0.04) 
COMM 0.2859** (0.01) 
0.1074 
(0.41) 
0.2834 
(0.43) 
0.2354** 
(0.01) 
0.0691 
(0.46) 
0.4005** 
(0.00) 
COMM2 -0.0637** (0.01) 
-0.0258 
(0.42) 
-0.0634 
(0.48) 
-0.0598** 
(0.01) 
-0.0156 
(0.50) 
-0.0932** 
(0.00) 
CCSPLIT 0.1552* (0.05) 
0.0436 
(0.58) 
0.4427* 
(0.05) 
0.1429** 
(0.01) 
-0.0669 
(0.35) 
0.3049** 
(0.00) 
BSIZE -0.0052 (0.74) 
-0.0149 
(0.30) 
-0.0319 
(0.13) 
-0.0083 
(0.52) 
0.0059 
(0.71) 
-0.0343* 
(0.03) 
SIZE -0.2053** (0.00) 
0.0517 
(0.25) 
0.0782 
(0.68) 
-0.0904* 
(0.05) 
-0.0764 
(0.21) 
-0.0462 
(0.54) 
GROWTH 0.0023** (0.00) 
0.0003** 
(0.00) 
0.0018** 
(0.00) 
0.0001 
(0.16) 
0.0003* 
(0.02) 
0.0019† 
(0.08) 
ROA 0.0116** (0.00) 
0.0043 
(0.18) 
0.0049 
(0.29) 
0.0124** 
(0.00) 
0.0074† 
(0.07) 
0.0088* 
(0.03) 
LEV 
-0.3859† 
(0.06) 
-0.3623* 
(0.05) 
-0.9473** 
(0.01) 
-0.1844 
(0.20) 
-0.1828 
(0.30) 
-0.5411* 
(0.02) 
CASH 0.7741 (0.28) 
0.3072 
(0.64) 
0.3473 
(0.75) 
0.6662 
(0.29) 
-1.0442* 
(0.04) 
1.5951† 
(0.07) 
WEDGE -0.1818 (0.20) 
-0.0875 
(0.42) 
0.1136 
(0.42) 
-0.3527* 
(0.04) 
-0.0923 
(0.26) 
-0.5090* 
(0.04) 
Adj-R2 0.7949 0.7678 0.8039 0.7856 0.6958 0.8096 
n 348 352 139 561 350 350 
 
Notes: Fixed effects regressions of firm value (Tobin’s Q) on board monitoring and control variables for family-owned 
companies. Family More Involved is when the family holds the Chairman and CEO positions. Family Less Involved is when 
the family does not hold both the Chairman and CEO positions. Blockholder is when a non-management-related blockholder 
exists with 10% or more of issued shares. No blockholder means such a blockholder doesn’t exist. More Debt means debt 
higher than the median. Less Debt means debt lower than the median. Tobin’s Q ratios (TQ) are calculated as total assets 
minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity all divided by total assets. Board independence (BIND) is the 
proportion of independent directors on the board. Committee monitoring (COMM) is calculated as one point for each 
monitoring-related committee (audit, nomination and remuneration). Chairman/CEO split (CCSPLIT) is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the positions are split. Board size (BSIZE) is the number of directors on the board. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets in millions of US dollars. Return on assets (ROA) and one-year sales growth (GROWTH) are 
percentages. Leverage (LEV) is the ratio of debt to total assets. Cash Rights (CASH) is the ultimate cashflow rights of the 
largest shareholder. WEDGE is the ratio of control rights to cashflow rights of the largest shareholder. Data is from 
Compustat and annual reports. Regressions include firm and period fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses. Significance 
levels are denoted by 1% **, 5% *, 10% †. 
  
 
